The Analytic Attitude: An Introduction

The analytic attitude ranks as one of Freud's greatest creations. If the analyst is to provide the analysand with the best chance for a searching and beneficial analysis, then he or she must maintain this attitude with a high degree of consistency. Both the findings of psychoanalysis as a method of investigation and its results as a method of treatment depend on this consistency. But what is the analytic attitude? Something so important should be formulated in a relatively concise, complex, and generally acceptable way, yet we have no such formulation. None was offered by Freud, though a version of his ideas on the analytic attitude can be derived from his papers on technique (see chapter 2), especially when these papers are considered in the context of all his works.

Over the years, many other analysts have published significant contributions to this topic. Typically they have done so in connection with their discussions of analytic technique. From a very long list of notable contributions of this sort, I wish to mention those made by Sandor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Wilhelm Reich, Otto Fenichel, Edward Glover, John Strachey, Ella Freeman Sharpe, Theodor Reik, Ernst Kris, Rudolph Loewenstein, Annie Reich, Edith Jacobson, Kurt Eissler, Ralph Greenson, Leo Stone, Jacob Arlow, Charles Brenner, Merton Gill, and Heinz Kohut. But it must be noted that this rich literature presents difficulties. For one thing, the chief emphases in these contributions are not always the same, there being variation, for example, with respect to the desirability of the analyst's maintaining emotional detachment, making early, deep interpretations, and focusing intensively on transference. Emphases also vary on manifesting a caretaking and self-expressive humanness, engaging in forceful and dramatic confrontations, and centering attention on the uses and significance of empathy. For another thing, in many in-
stances the relevance of these discussions to the analytic attitude, being only implicit, must be teased out, and so may be construed differently by different readers. And finally, some of these technical contributions are more controversial than others, or at least are more difficult to include in a general synthesis.

But it is not only in writings on technique that one may find contributions to a formulation of the analytic attitude, for this attitude is often beautifully exemplified in analytic writings on psychological development, psychopathology, general theory, the theory of the analytic process, and applications to the humanities. Here, the names of Erik Erikson, D. W. Winnicott, Heinz Hartmann, and Hans Loewald, to name now only a few of many, may be added to those already mentioned. In these writings the analytic attitude is exemplified in the kinds of questions that are raised, the evidence that is selected, the clear-sighted and balanced way in which it is interpreted and integrated, and the individualized evocative mode of expression ("the voice") that has been cultivated. Thus the psychoanalytic literature as a whole may be read from the point of view of what it can teach about the analytic attitude. Again, however, there are difficulties. One finds variation with respect to what should be taken as the major features of the analytic attitude, in addition to which some of these exemplifications are more open to theoretical controversy than others or present more obstacles to a general synthesis.

Could it be that what stands in the way of a satisfactory formulation of the analytic attitude is a problem that is more fundamental than anything that has yet been mentioned? Analytic pedagogy suggests that there is such a problem. It has become a pedagogical commonplace to acknowledge that, as a rule, students learn more about the analytic attitude from undergoing their own personal analyses and the supervision of their clinical work than they do from case seminars, more from case seminars than from didactic courses on technique and the theory of the analytic process, and more from these didactic courses than from independent reading. This commonplace recognizes how much always depends on context, most of all on the concrete context made up by the individual analyst and analysand, the nature of the problems being analyzed, and the phase of the analysis under discussion. Consequently, the project of presenting a definitive set of generalizations about the analytic attitude cannot be undertaken very hopefully, for these generalizations will serve only as the roughest of guidelines for sorting out, one from the other, the full, the compromised, and the failed analytic attitude. Moreover, a set of such gener-

alizations cannot fail to sound like an overblown admonition to be a good analyst.

Now, it need not be argued that doing analysis is taxing intellectually and emotionally and that, as this work is done by human beings who, fortunately, are neither machines, saints, nor romantic heroes, it is not to be expected that in each and every case the analyst will function impeccably from beginning to end. But to recognize human limitation and variability is not to conclude that it is useless or foolish to attempt to set forth standards of excellence for analytic work. Nor is it to come to the conclusion that formulating the ideal analytic attitude is equivalent to idealizing, platitudinizing, or being oppressively perfectionistic. For it is on the individual analyst's efforts to approximate this ideal that the beneficial effects of analyzing largely depend, and in the final analysis it is these individual efforts which must concern us. Therefore it seems to me that it will be worth the effort and the risk to introduce the chapters that make up this book with a brief outline of my conception of the analytic attitude. The chapters themselves will have to bear most of the burden of exemplifying this conception. Ultimately, it is concrete exemplification that counts.

The Analyst Maintains an Attitude of Neutrality

The analyst remains neutral in relation to every aspect of the material being presented by the analysand. This is material that is presented not only verbally but nonverbally, not only consciously but preconsciously and unconsciously, and not only in great distress but sometimes blithely or blandly. In his or her neutrality, the analyst does not crusade for or against the so-called id, superego, or defensive ego. The analyst has no favorites and so is not judgmental. The analyst's position is, as Anna Freud (1936) put it, "equidistant" from the various forces at war with one another.

The simplistic, partisan analyst, working in terms of saints and sinners, victims and victimizers, or good and bad ways to live, is failing to maintain the analytic attitude. In this failure, he or she can only be encouraging the analysand to fixate on some pattern of paranoid and depressive orientations, to persevere in sadomasochistic fantasizing and acting out, or to engage in wholesale repression of disturbing factors.
an or the concomitant material to be fully represented, interpreted, and worked through. The neutral analyst is also attempting to avoid both the imposition of his or her own personal values on the analysand and the unquestioning acceptance of the analysand's initial value judgments. In addition, the neutral analyst is being unassuming, for it is a plain fact that for a very long time very little is known or understood well enough to warrant the analyst's forming any opinion at all on the desirability or undesirability of one or another course of action or mode of experience. (The exception being only that there are rough guidelines for what may seriously disrupt the continuity or effectiveness of the analysis or threaten the basic welfare of the analysand. These factors include the analysand's constant precipitation of life crises, prolonged absences, nonpayment of fees, acts of gross delinquency, physical illness, toxicity, suicidal depression, schizophrenic regression, etc.)

Owing to his or her recognition that over the course of an analysis the analysand will present highly selective and changing pictures of other people, the neutral analyst remains nonjudgmental about these others, too. It is particularly important to maintain this neutrality in relation to parental figures and spouses, for to some extent the analysand is identified with them and is vulnerable to the same value judgments that may be passed on them. Also, the analysand may be referring to other people in order to represent indirectly, as in a dream, some disturbing feature of his or her own self. For this reason, too, the analyst must take care to regard these others neutrally. But the effort to remain neutral toward all parties concerned should not lead the analyst to avoid looking at things honestly and, when appropriate, taking them up forthrightly with the analysand. It is not a departure from neutrality to call a spade a spade.

To achieve neutrality requires a high degree of subordination of the analyst's personality to the analytic task at hand. Subordination of personality is not to be understood as making misguided, futile, and phobically aseptic efforts at elimination of personality, as in total nonexpressiveness. It is to be understood in terms of the analyst's appropriate moderation, regulation, and often simply curtailment of any show of activity of a predominantly narcissistic sort. Narcissistic activity both implies and readily makes for disruptive countertransference reactions. It is the sort of activity through which the analyst tries to cure by "force of personality," or to "win at analysis" (as though at war), or to demonstrate analytic "genius" conclusively. Such vanity through appropriate subordination of personality, however, lies in the analyst's adopting a condemning attitude toward that which is different, not readily understandable, or difficult. In this case the analyst too easily feels frustrated because the analysis is not developing in the wished-for or expected way, and so he or she is all too ready to become self-righteous and punitive. Additional problems of this sort stem from the analyst's insisting, in a blunt, rigid, and disrespectful way, on a few familiar lines of interpretation. For in being thus insistent the analyst is being a bully and is not allowing the analysand to explore freely and experience fully the complex network of derivatives of unresolved, unconsciously perpetuated, infantile issues. Because these are the issues in terms of which the analysand has been living his or her painful and limited existence, they must be helped to emerge into the light of analysis in their individualized forms.

A desirable degree of subordination of personality will be evident in the analyst's remaining curious, eager to find out, and open to surprise. It will be evident also in the analyst's taking nothing for granted (without being cynical about it), and remaining ready to revise conjectures or conclusions already arrived at, tolerate ambiguity or incomplete closure over extended periods of time, accept alternative points of view of the world, and bear and contain the experiences of helplessness, confusion, and aloneness that not infrequently mark periods of analytic work with each analysand.

The Analyst Avoids Either-Or Thinking

The analytic attitude is evident in the analyst's taking great care to avoid viewing significant problems and figures in either-or terms. For if there is anything that consistently characterizes psychoanalytic interpretation it is the analyst's recognition that multiple and often contradictory meanings and consequences may be usefully ascribed to on phenomenon, and that common meanings and consequences may be ascribed to apparently diverse phenomena. Much time in analysis is spent interpreting the analysand's need to see things as either black or white.

But progressive movement in analytic interpretation is not on/
and hostile as well as defensive and self-punitive features. They may take the form of rebellion or submission, control or helplessness, flat-tery or insult, excitement or lassitude, seductiveness or rejection, etc. The analyst's obligation is to analyze these overtures, particularly by interpreting their resistant and transferential origins, functions, and significance.

By not responding in kind I mean, for example, not meeting love with love or rejection or exploitation; not meeting anger with retaliation or self-justification or appeasement; and not meeting confidences with thanks or with self-revelations of one's own. As a rule, responding in kind impedes the work of analysis. Sometimes the analyst is in a position to interpret these overtures immediately; sometimes only after preparatory confrontation of the fact of emotional pressure on the analyst and after clarification of its occasion and its connections. Most often he or she can only do so by deferring any response at all until the pressure has taken definite form, reached noteworthy intensity, and led to its own clarification, through the delivery of further associations by the analysand, which is to say only after a period of careful listening by the analyst.

The analyst's ideal is to rely so far as possible on interpretation and careful preparation for interpretation through confrontation and clarification. This ideal will appear to be inhumanly rigid, exploitative, authoritarian, or unsupportive only to those who reject the general guidelines of psychoanalytic understanding and so do not appreciate the benefits ultimately to be derived from the analyst's consistently maintaining the analytic attitude. There does exist a stereotype of the Freudian analyst as one who maintains an arid, stiff, utterly impersonal atmosphere in the analytic session. But in fact there is always room in analytic work for courtesy, cordiality, gentleness, sincere empathic participation and comment, and other such personal, though not socially intimate, modes of relationship. These modes of relationship are recognized to be part of the preparation for interpretation in that they help develop an atmosphere of safety within which the analysand may begin to communicate that which is most distressing, exciting, secret, or conceptually unformed. In addition, these modes of relationship help the analyst to work in a relaxed and poised a fashion as possible.

Because it would fall within the province of technique to discuss fully how far one may go, and in which direction in order to prepare the way for interpretation, nothing of that sort will be developed here. But emphasizing the importance of careful preparation does belong to
A formulation of the analytic attitude, and it is this consideration which warrants my saying that the analysis should take place in a context of unabashed, unfussy, untheatrical, and unhectoring human relatedness. This requirement holds even if most of that relatedness is shaped and limited by a radical division of labor between analyst and analysand. (As I said, the analyst is not obliged to respond in kind.) And this requirement holds even if at one time or another most of that specialized relatedness will itself be examined analytically as to what it implies for the analysand in the way of gratification, deprivation, and compromise.

In this respect, there is a tension in analytic work that can never be dispelled, nor should one try to dispel it. The question of preparation for interpretation introduces just one aspect of this general tension which may be summed up in the following way. Except with respect to relatively clearcut extremes, the analyst cannot know exactly just when, what, how, and how long to interpret, or, as the case may be, not to interpret but instead to listen or introduce some other type of intervention. As a rule, the meanings and effects of the analyst's interventions and silences may be adequately formulated only after the fact, if then. Will it be or was it "correct" to smile when saying hello or goodbye, to laugh at the analysand's joke, to ask or answer a particular question? Has the analyst persevered adequately in working through an issue interpretively before concluding that interpretation has reached its limits and that perhaps what Eissler (1953) called a parameter is now in order? Can the analyst be sure in advance what will be the "cost to the ego" (as Eissler called it) of each intervention or, I would add, nonintervention?

In these respects, it is not necessary that the analyst get obsessionally bogged down in doubt about what to do or how to be. For, I do believe that much is already known about how to prepare the way for, and to arrive at, timely and plausible if not probably correct interpretations, and I also believe that what is known can be taught to students and consolidated and extended by them as they gain clinical experience. The fact remains, however, that analysts cannot avoid experiencing the tension of being required to act under conditions of incomplete understanding. They must be prepared to intervene interpretively and expressively (or to refrain from that) just in order to develop further whatever understanding they already believe has been achieved. The analyst who tries to avoid this tension rather than recognize and accept it as being one of the inherent features of analytic work is the analyst who is seriously involved in his or her illusions of omniscience, in either-or thinking, and in artificial impersonality.

A final word on the analyst as analyzer. Analyzing is not giving didactic instructions on how to be a "good" or comfortable analysand, nor is it teaching psychoanalytic generalizations about individual development or the way of the world. Certainly it is not giving advice and reassurance or issuing commands or prohibitions. As a rule, acting in any of these ways is neither analyzing nor preparing the way for interpretation. Most likely it is setting limits on what can be worked through later in the analysis. Consequently, such departures from the analytic attitude should be carefully limited. They may only be expressions of the analyst's narcissistically wishing to play guru. And the more the analyst plays guru, the more he or she reinforces the resistance to one important aspect of what remains to be analyzed more fully, namely, the analysand's presentation of a weak, empty, fragmented, "castrated," ego to the analyst in hopes of receiving his or her good ministrations (which, for the analysand, may be sadistic, rapacious, depriving, etc.). Freud (1919) noted long ago that one should never underestimate the human being's irresolution and craving for authority. One of the analyst's temptations, much played on by the irresolute analysand, is to purvey wisdom when it would be more appropriate to the job at hand to analyze wisely.

The Analyst Aims to Be Helpful

As has been mentioned, analytic help is offered not through advice, reassurance, exhortation, or other such measures, but so far as possible through careful listening and judicious and well-prepared interpretation. The help that is offered is help in understanding one's past and present life more fully in order to be able to change oneself for the better (however that may be individually worked out over the course of analysis).

Analysts do not view their role as one of offering or promising remedies, cures, complete mental health, philosophies of life, rescue, emergency-room intervention, emotional Band-Aids, or self-sacrificing or self-aggrandizing heroics. It is more than likely that each of these alternatives to a primarily interpretive approach manifests countertransference.
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Well-prepared analysts expect analysands to respond ambivalently and resistively to analytic help because, as I shall continue to emphasize, unconsciously analysands can only view understanding and changing as dangerous. Analysts know that their analysands will live up to their agreement to abide by the fundamental rule and other practical arrangements of analysis only in the compromised ways by which they characteristically live up to all their other significant agreements. They know that they will have to direct many of their interpretations at these compromised, conflictual, resistant ways of collaborating. Consequently, analysts expect their work to be demanding, and they anticipate that it will require full use of their intelligence, tact, empathy, vigilance, interpretive ingenuity, and patience.

Because the analytic attitude, therefore, has no place in it for undue therapeutic or didactic zeal, it provides no work-appropriate opportunity for the analyst to feel frustrated, disappointed, or impatient. This is so with respect to the consequences of a single intervention, a single session, or the entire course of the analysis. The analyst expects to find not only as the work proceeds what can be accomplished analytically, but also to feel a certain amount of frustration, disappointment, or impatience. The analyst may feel that he or she is being thwarted in his or her efforts at a countertransference reaction. In such an instance, the complaining analyst does not see that therapeutic or didactic zeal has replaced the analytic attitude. In the cases in question, the analytic questions always remain (1) what can be learned about the unyieldingness of certain characteristics which have already been subjected to considerable analysis, and (2) what can be learned about the analysand’s having begun inappropriately to feel frustrated, disappointed, angry, or impatient. Sometimes the lesson to be learned is that the analysis has gone as far as it can go (for the time being, anyway). In extreme cases, the lesson may be that analysis is not the method of choice. But very often, assuming that the analysand has been treated with some care and that the analyst is adequately equipped, the lesson is just that some negative countertransference has developed which calls for self-analysis or supervisory consultation.

A major feature of the analyst’s helpfulness is the maintenance of a spectul affirmation attitude. Although this constituent of the analytic attitude will be described and illustrated in some detail in later chapters, a few words about it are in place here. Recognizing, as Freud did, that the analysand fears insight and change, the analyst is always ready to view the difficulties presented by the analysand not in a negative light but rather as meaningful, even if still obscure, expressions of the very problems that call for analysis. These difficulties are compromises. That is to say, they are ways in which, unconsciously, the analysand simultaneously obtains gratification, maintains a sense of security and integration, and satisfies needs to be punished. Because the analysand has a large stake in maintaining the status quo, the analyst must approach the attendant difficulties respectfully. When, for example, an analysand says, “Skepticism is the only way of looking at the world in which I have confidence,” the affirmative analytic attitude will be expressed not in trying to induce the analysand to give up that conviction as soon as possible, but rather in trying patiently to understand and interpret all the emotionally contradictory uses of that conviction in the analysand’s psychical reality. For the analyst, analyzing is not an alternative to being helpful; it is the analytic way of being helpful. It is just that the manifest gains produced by this effort to be helpful may not be immediate, unambiguous, of an expected or easily recognizable sort, or instantly responded to by the analysand with unbounded joy.

I lay no claim that this introductory outline of the analytic attitude is particularly original, that it is adequately comprehensive and detailed, or that it is entirely incontestable. As I indicated earlier, it is intended to convey as briefly as possible the ideal I have come to aspire to in my work as an analyst. This ideal selectively condenses the best of what I have learned from my teachers, my reading, my clinical work, and my previous efforts to teach or to write on topics that bear on the analytic attitude. The extent to which I have approached my ideal may be judged not so much from this introduction as from the following chapters on theory, empathy, interpretation, and technique.

1 William I. Grossman, personal communication
The Atmosphere of Safety: Freud's "Papers on Technique" (1911-1915)

Introduction

Today's psychoanalysts must deal with an ever-increasing number of challenges to the traditional or classical analytic method. On the one hand are the actively confrontational therapists and the sex therapists who, at least implicitly, claim to bring about structural changes (such as radical modification of defenses) that have been held to be the special achievement of the psychoanalytic method. On the other hand working within psychoanalysis who, while denying any revisionist orientation, are developing new approaches to technique with special classes of analysands. In the latter case, with which I am here concerned, reference is made to an increase in the number of severely narcissistic and borderline patients and phenomena, their refractoriness to the classical method, and the special requirements of doing analytic work with them. Inevitably, questions arise for analysts as to whether these challenges call for fundamental modifications of analytic attitude and technique or merely describe advances based on more sophisticated thinking through of the theoretical and technical implications of Freud's papers, perhaps especially his paper, "On Narcissism" (1914b).

In the face of such challenges, it is always useful to go back to Freud and review or reconsider the recommendations he made in his "Papers on Technique" (1911-1915; all page references below are to these papers in the Standard Edition, 12). Not that Freud insisted on absolute uniformity of approach—far from it. He presented his recommendations as being appropriate "on the average," and he warned against "mechanization" of his method (p. 123). Although he said very little about specific variations on his ideal approach, he did refer in a general way to educative and also need-gratifying moves on the analyst's part. He also stated explicitly, even then, that one may expect to encounter comparatively few analysands who will prove to be suitable for the consistent carrying through of his recommendations (p. 131). It is, I think, warranted to assume that already at that early time he did not expect very many analyses to be carried through to some ideal completion. Much later, in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937a), he was explicit on this point.

Consequently, my review of Freud's recommendations is not presented as a reading which will definitely establish a prescription for a single, invariant, correct, and infallible technique. In undertaking this assessment, I hope only to define a number of reference points with respect to which those who are assessing these variations may differentiate them as to type and also estimate their extent. But however modest my undertaking, it must be an interpretation of Freud. This is so for three reasons at least. First, Freud made a number of dogmatic statements the appropriate qualification of which can only be achieved by interpreting the total context of his discussions. Secondly, he made a number of ambiguous statements which also call for interpretation in context. An important aspect of the total context is the manner in which Freud set forth his recommendations, that is, his consistently neutral tone and his dispassionate curiosity concerning the variety, complexity, and subtlety of the problems with which one must come to grips. Thirdly, even if Freud had recommended strict uniformity, the fact is that we have had a number of different readings of his text on technique, and it could not have been otherwise, for texts exist only in relation to the orientation and values brought to them by each reader. No text can anticipate and control advances in knowledge and skill and changing times and values.

It is my contention that throughout Freud's discussions there runs a concern with progressively establishing an atmosphere of safety in the analysis. I make this claim even though I found only the following single explicit reference to safety in these papers. In taking up the analyst's response to the erotic or romantic demands that the female analysand will make at the height of her positive transference to the male analyst, Freud pointed out that it is only by being proof against every such temptation that the analyst will make it possible for her to "feel safe enough to allow all her preconditions for loving, all the phantasies springing from her sexual desires, all the detailed charac-
teristics of her state of being in love, to come to light, and from these she will herself open the way to the infantile roots of her love" (p. 166). One does, of course, want to help open up this way to the infantile, for it is a fundamental aspect of carrying out an analysis. However, the project of progressively making the analysis safe is obviously far more complex than showing that one is proof against libidinal temptation.

For more than frankly heterosexual demands are in question when one speaks of the temptations besetting the analyst. The analyst must be proof against temptations of every sort in every aspect of carrying out an effective analysis. To mention only a few other temptations: there is the masochistic analysand's "seduction of the aggressor" (Loewenstein, 1957); there is the temptation to enter into a bitter power struggle when the analysand shows the full force of his or her negative transference; there are seductions away from an empathic stance; and there are seductions into panic as when regressive self-experience is dramatically displayed.

In developing a reading of Freud's technical papers around the theme of safety, one runs a considerable but, I think, unavoidable risk of tediously reviewing what is already well known and has already been adequately reviewed and discussed in the literature. One hesitates to attempt to go beyond Leo Stone's excellent monograph, The Psychoanalytic Situation (1961), or Greenson's text (1967). Nor can one avoid the risk of reading more into Freud's words than he could have intended at that stage of his development. One also runs the risk of seeming to recommend an indiscriminately adulatory attitude toward Freud—the Freud who "knew it all," as is sometimes said. Well, I do believe that Freud already knew much that we now pride ourselves on having only just come to know, even though he did not know it, and could not have known it, in quite the way that we do today. And finally there is the risk of giving the impression that the atmosphere of safety was Freud's sole or major concern. It was not so. My claim is only that it was a steady concern that may be recognized, often between the lines.

Unless one reviews Freud's writings continuously, and from one or another point of view, one finds it difficult to maintain some organized and comprehensive conception of the fundamentals of the very technique by way of which he gathered the data that support or justify his theory of psychoanalysis. And there is always room in these reviews for some further penetration and amplification as well as critical discussion of Freud. In the final section of this chapter I shall take up briefly a few of the major points that today seem to be problematic.

I have organized my review of Freud's technical papers under five headings: the difficulties in the way of change; the complexity and the ambiguity of change and the attitude of finding out; the importance of a disciplined approach; the importance of an empathic approach; and the importance of the analyst's confidence in the analysand and in himself or herself. I shall not review systematically or exhaustively the many points Freud made about the handling of specific arrangements and problems which must be part of any attempt at analysis and which, each in its own way, may be shown to add to the atmosphere of safety.

In view of the general familiarity with Freud's papers that can be safely assumed, I shall use direct quotations sparingly, and then mainly to highlight some of Freud's less frequently cited, though extremely significant, observations and arguments. Page references to specific points will be appropriate only in certain instances.

The Papers on Technique

THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF CHANGE

The adult analysand comes to analysis with a troubled life story, the beginning of which is gradually seen to extend back to earliest childhood. The formative influences of that early period play a part in virtually every important aspect of his or her life. The process of change during analysis must contend with a vast network of disguised expressions, derivatives, and reactions against them; of assets and achievements which have been developed out of these and subsequently have come to be valued in their own right; and of adjustments to personal limitations which go hand in hand with the strengths of the analysand and which he or she will not confront gladly. At the core of this formidable problematic life is extreme infantile anxiety or a sense of danger that serves unconsciously as a major rationale for the analysand's ever-present and ever-problematic resistance. Consequently, fundamental personality change can take place only slowly and in a manner that cannot be predetermined (p. 130), and an atmosphere of safety can only be developed slowly and uncertainly.
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continuing resistances that, inappropriately and defensively, the analyst will keep trying to prove something about the completeness of his or her own personal analysis. This may be attempted, for example, by developing an attacking, exhorting, or at least impatient attitude toward the analysand’s resistances—none of which can contribute to the necessary atmosphere of safety. If, by definition, the still resistant analyst does not feel adequately safe, how can the analysand? Beyond the implication that one should not persecute the resisting analysand, there is the further implication that one should be satisfied with the limits of analytic achievement in each case. Admittedly, it is no easy matter to arrive analytically at a determination of these limits.

Freud recognized that the study of the resistance must itself play a central part in the analysis. That is to say, he recognized that there is something fundamentally antithetical to the analytic attitude in viewing the resistance as anything other than additional analytic material to be interpreted. It is material from which a great deal can be extracted concerning the history and current status of the analysand’s problems. Freud went so far as to say that the greatest analytic gains will be made through the analysis of the resistance (p. 155). This emphasis only gained in force with the advent of the structural point of view and its technical implication of the need for thorough analysis of the ego, especially of preferred defensive strategies and their history. This productive, affirmative orientation toward resistance is essential in establishing an atmosphere of safety. Initially taken as a danger, the consistent, patient, and neutral analysis of resistance gets to be one of the analysand’s criteria of the analyst’s empathy and understanding, and thus a basis for consciously tolerating progressively less distorted derivatives of infantile conflict.

Anxiety as a motive for resistance came into its own in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (Freud, 1926), ten to fifteen years after Freud wrote his papers on technique. At the time he wrote these technical papers, he was dealing with the role of anxiety in resistance mostly by implication, for he was then more concerned to emphasize the resistance to giving up the unconscious infantile gratifications obtained through symptoms, character traits, and other forms of repetition or acting out. There, he attributed this resistance to the unconscious infantile wishes (p. 103). He estimated that the strength of these infantile wishes and the depth of their unconscious gratification exert far more influence over the analysis than the conscious suffering that brings one to analysis (p. 143). It is in connection with this source of resistance that the promotion of the positive transference assumed
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inactivity as a regular and rigid practice. Rather, in speaking of a process that goes its own way, he was warning the analyst not to be too directive on the basis of preconceived ideas about technique, psychopathology, and desirable outcomes.

Freud intended to emphasize the complexity and novelty of the explanations that will have to be worked out during the analysis. He recognized that there is no simple truth about symptoms or developmental factors (p. 99). He discouraged the analyst from either defining particular sectors to work in or presenting specific goals to the patient. It is “evenly suspended attention” that is called for (p. 113), inasmuch as it is usually only after the initial communication of analytic material that its significance may be defined and estimated. This significance may be surprising. Clearly, any other approach forecloses the issues, which is to say that it fosters new compromise formations or intensifies old defenses. Freud also stressed the danger of the analyst's projecting his or her peculiarities into the analysand and then overgeneralizing to all analysands or all people from this already biased view of the analytic data (p. 117). His warning against one's getting too excited by apparently corroborative material dished up by the analysand may be recalled in this connection.

What these recommendations add up to is this. The appropriate analytic attitude is one of finding out: finding out what the analysis itself will be or be concerned with; where the principal work will be done, which, as he said, need not be in the same locale as where the principal conflicts are (p. 104); how this work will best be done; and, by implication, finding out when, why, and how to establish a termination of the analysis.

According to Freud, there are guidelines or constraints that must ordinarily be observed, such as the introduction of the fundamental rule, the recumbent position of the analysand, and the frequency and regularity of analytic sessions. But Freud was also indicating that these factors must be understood as helping to establish a framework within which the analysis will be jointly created by analyst and analysand. The analysis is created by a continuing examination and interpretation of its progress and the obstacles to its further progress. It begins to become evident how much in each case the psychoanalytic process is a study of itself as it is created in and through the analytic dialogue (see chapter 14). What else can it be if it is always a matter of finding out where one is going, how, why, and with which consequences?

Freud did not take for granted the usefulness of the initial amnesic data or the correctness of one's initial diagnostic impression. In-
stead, he recommended a trial analysis of one or two weeks during which time the analyst could hope to identify what we might now call pseudoneurotic schizoid personalities or borderline personalities, those patients who, in his view, are not adequately analyzable owing to their essential unrelatedness to other people.

Freud recognized that just as it is difficult to maintain an interpretive analytic attitude toward resistance, it is difficult to maintain the nondirective constituent of the analytic attitude. A part of the problem is this, that in a general way the analyst can often recognize a good deal of the primitive, conflictual significance of material being presented by the analysand and can anticipate its further elaboration. However, Freud saw that there was a long way between the analyst's knowing something and the analysand's knowing it. At the same time he saw that the analysand might know something consciously and yet at the same time not know it in the sense of having insightfully established meaningful connections with hitherto unconscious significant conflicts and their infantile origins. He was aware that the analysand could be frightened by too knowing a stance on the analyst's part or by too hasty, deep, or insistent an interpretation. Although Freud did not go into detail, he was making room for the unpredictable specifics of the analytic process, that is, for those turns in the work by way of which certain types of conflict in certain realms of life, certain dreams and symptomatic variations, and the like, prove to be the best routes to insight and working through.

Before finding and traversing these routes, the analyst can only have an intellectualized, incomplete, and relatively nonspecific or nonindividualized kind of insight. Although useful to the analyst while listening, it is not usable insight—or not yet that—and for the analysand its being verbalized can be frightening. Bringing it up explicitly may intensify resistances. The directive question, “How do you get from here to there?” is, therefore, usually less appropriate as a guide for implementing the analytic attitude than the questions, “Just where are we anyway and where will we get to from here?” It is the finding out questions that define the freest type of adherence by both analyst and analysand to the fundamental rule. What I am stressing is not so much a matter of technique as it is a guiding attitude toward the complexity and the ambiguity of psychoanalytic change. Arriving at the most individualized version of insightful change is, in the end, the only really safe and therefore effective analytic objective.

To refer again to the time when we ourselves were analysands, we need only think of just how great and unanticipated were the varieties of content and the types of change that had to be dealt with before it was possible to know at first hand our defenses, our Oedipus complexes, our analytico, orality, and narcissism. Only when the approach is thus individualized can one arrive at the belief, and feel secure in the belief, that one's own analyst is indeed an analyst and that the analysis is indeed an analysis of oneself. The analyst's offering generalized wisdom or universal insight can establish only the self-limiting, unstable, and resistance-intensifying security of submission to omniscience.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISCIPLINED APPROACH**

The topic of discipline as a constituent of the analytic attitude provoked some of Freud's most dogmatic and ambiguous statements. He urged, for example, that the analyst adopt the attitude of a surgeon (p. 115); that he be only a mirror to the analysand (pp. 117–118); and that he enforce abstinence (p. 165). Leo Stone (1961) did a good deal to clear up the confusion engendered by these problematic statements. More recently, in an analysis of Freud's analytic attitude, Samuel Lipton (1977) has clarified matters further, though perhaps not uncontroversially. In general, it can be said that the contexts and tones of Freud's remarks made it clear enough that he was urging a disciplined approach in which considerations of what will be most helpful to the analysis, and therefore to the analysand, will always be foremost in the analyst's mind. Thus, when recommending that the analyst remain cold, he was thinking of the surgeon's skill and decisiveness. One might say that he was distinguishing between sentimental or maudlin analysis and analysis ruled by disciplined compassion.

Freud did not want the analyst to inject his own personality forcibly into the analytic process, neither deliberately nor through blatant countertransferences. He did not want the analyst to take the idealizing and erotic transference as a personal tribute. He did not want the analyst to be guided rigidly by ordinary considerations of delicacy and restraint in taking up what needs to be taken up and doing so in an effective way. Freud stressed truthfulness as fundamental to the analytic attitude (p. 164), and he emphasized "honorable" procedure when he spoke of preparing the analysand early for the rigors of analytic work (p. 129). One might add to this that it is only on the basis of progress within an analysis that the analysand dares to believe deeply, even if only intermittently, in this truthfulness, when it is there, and to comprehend fully, even if unstably, the inescapability of the rigors of the work. In the case of the analytic process, truly informed consent
can be established only step by step and on the basis of an increasing sense of safety.

Additionally, Freud did not want the analyst to yield thoughtlessly or too readily to the not infrequent demands for gratifications in the analytic relationship, for he understood that the analyst's doing so can only obscure resistances, make the analysis of transference all the more difficult, and diminish the motivation for further work. He did not want the analyst to give the analysand permission to suspend observance of the fundamental rule, that one report all of one's thoughts without regard to conventional standards of coherence, importance, or decorum; instead, the analyst should attempt to analyze the departures from frankness that invariably occur. He did not want the analyst to count on the usefulness of sharing confidence with the analysand as a way of promoting the analysis. Nor did he want the analyst to confuse personal and professional relationship on the one hand and analytic relationship on the other, for the distinction to be made is necessary to protect the analyst's own emotional life and the neutrality and objectivity of the work of analysis. Admittedly, the distinction between the two types of relationship is sometimes difficult to draw, but it is fully warranted at least to be concerned to draw it. Freud's consistent objective was to do as little as possible to further complicate the inevitably complex analysis of resistance and transference.

A word is in order here concerning the analyst's being a "mirror" and remaining "opaque" to the analysand. Freud's recommendation does not legitimize stiff formality, impassivity, and remoteness. The "mirror" refers to the analyst's reflecting back to the analysand, now in neutral analytic form, what the analysand has been showing unconsciously in his or her associations and behavior. It is an active, transformational mirror and so is not a mirror at all. The metaphor is not well chosen. It is better to call this mirroring a psychoanalytic reading of the analysand's text (see especially chapters 11, 12, and 16). In the same vein, "opaque" refers to the analyst's not using personal disclosure as a major tool of analysis. "Opaque" would be better called the subordination of the analyst's biography and personality to the task at hand. The term "subordination" is superior to "opaqueness" in two respects. First, it implies the recognition that total personal opaqueness is impossible to achieve and, owing to its artificiality, technically undesirable as a goal. Second, it indicates the continuing need for flexibility and imagination on the analyst's part in achieving, with suitable variation from one analysand to the next, an analytic version of himself or herself, a second self that integrates the analyst's own biog-

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raphy and personality with the constraints of the analytic method and the needs of each analysand (see chapter 3).

There must be many reasons for the absoulteness with which Freud stated some of his recommendations on discipline. The dissensions in the analytic movement during the early teens of this century must be mentioned here. I would suggest that in part this absoulteness also be taken as a sign that Freud recognized how powerful are the analyst's defensive and transference needs as well as his or her narcissistic needs. The young analyst, he observed, is particularly vulnerable to heterosexual erotic transference. This point must be extended to include vulnerability to homosexual erotic transference, though in this respect the vulnerability is more likely to be shown by blind spots and defensive displacement of analytic interest than by manifest sexual arousal. One way or another, the analyst's temptation is to use the analytic work to get otherwise unavailable gratifications, support faltering defenses, enhance grandiose fantasies, and, in the end, to use the analysand rather than to work for him or her. How much the analysand's sense of danger within the analysis depends on the frequency and extent of the analyst's nonneutral violations of trust in this respect!

One need not be an apologist for Freud to read his strictures on discipline as statements of his recognition of, and respect for, the frailties of the analyst at work and the ambiguity of the work itself. It is even possible to infer that Freud had learned a great deal from errors of his own in these respects.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EMPATHIC APPROACH

In connection with empathy, though not expressly under that heading, Freud made a number of important recommendations. One should not rush to interpret everything one sees at any moment. One should avoid humiliating the analysand through responding nonanalytically to manifestations of transference, that is, by preaching, acquiescing, rejecting, etc. One should make interpretations that are but a step ahead of where the analysand is and, ideally, should make them in such a way as to let him or her get the solution (p. 140). The associative response to one's intervention should always be scrutinized in order to test out the intervention's correctness and to decide whether further interpretation is required. It is important not to overestimate the analysand's capacity for sublimation. Nor should one expect an unrestricted capacity for object relations on the part of analysands.
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with significant narcissistic problems. One should demonstrate an attitude of sympathetic understanding and concern from early on in the relationship (pp. 139-140). It is essential to maintain an attitude of flexibility with regard to the analytic route that will be taken by the analysand and the level on which he or she will be functioning from moment to moment (pp. 123-124). One must always take into account the inevitability of ambivalence in human relationships. And one ought to be satisfied with whatever the fruits of the day’s work may be.

In contrast to Freud’s strict statements in connection with the disciplined approach, this set of statements suggests that the analytic attitude must include gentleness, undemandingness, open-mindedness, flexibility, patience, tentativeness, spontaneity and individuality (p. 111), and willingness to go along. What matters is not so much bountiful expressions of empathy as such, for these can be condensing, gratuitous, maudlin, overstimulating, or seductive. Rather, as in the case of resistance, what matters is an unflagging recognition that one must function essentially as an empathic, facilitating supervisor of the analysand’s further development through analysis (see, for example, p. 130). I would not say the analysand’s “guide,” as that term implies both detailed knowledge of the terrain and preestablished goals, a better metaphor is the analyst as a seasoned and harry co-explorer. In any case, a facilitating supervisor is neither a tyrant nor a martinet, neither a mindreader nor a controlling architect of the personality. Freud’s steady preoccupation with resistance may be viewed in the light of the analyst’s playing this helpful role. Elsewhere, as I mentioned, he emphasized the dread of change that underlies the resistance, indicating that the analyst’s awareness of this dread can only add to empathic facilitation. As a facilitating supervisor, the analyst is safe; as an enforcer or mastermind, however manifestly benevolent in intent, he or she can only be experienced as dangerous by the analysand (for example, as a castrating, abandoning, or engulping figure, one who is the external embodiment of fantasized persecutors or omnipotent infantile imagos).

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANALYST’S CONFIDENCE

Freud emphasized that everything that comes up in the analysis has an actual or potential analytic yield. The analysand must learn that this is so (p. 93), and the analyst must keep on relearning it. Everything can be put to use, including the resistance.

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Freud took an impressively affirmative view of the trends which are being expressed in the neurotic symptoms. In connection with the importance of directing the analysand’s attention to the phenomena of his illness, such as the precise wording of obsessional ideas, Freud said this: “His illness itself must no longer seem to him contemptible, but must become an enemy worthy of his mettle, a piece of his personality, which has solid ground for its existence and out of which things of value for his future life have to be derived” (p. 152).

Further, Freud encouraged the recognition of the continuity between the old and the new in transference, both within the analysis and within relationships in everyday life. He saw the necessity of tolerating the apparent aimlessness of the analytic work (p. 94). He appreciated how many, varied, and subtle are the forms of remembering through dreams, screen memories, repetitive acting out, character attitudes, and the like, which is to say that he was confident that the important life-historical material which is consciously unavailable permeates what often appear to be irrelevant or inadequate data. He urged confidence in the mutual understanding between analyst and analysand of unconscious mental processes (p. 115). He trusted in the persistence of dynamic contexts beyond the immediate time when they first come up, expecting that material of importance not arrived at during one day’s session may very well be arrived at subsequently (p. 94).

Freud’s brave view of the effects of constructions or reconstructions of the infantile past is striking (pp. 148–150; see also his later paper, “Constructions in Analysis” [1937b]). He asserted that it makes no difference whether the analysand ever gets to remember the early events or experiences that are constructed by the analyst. Here Freud showed remarkable confidence in determining the correctness and value of constructions. It is not conscious testimony that counts in what is recalled or reorganized and what is changed in feeling and behavior; it is consequences, that is, the consequences of constructions. Once a construction has been worked through adequately, the analysand knows and uses unconsciously something that, consciously, he or she can only assent to intellectually. Here is a significant reversal of Freud’s usual emphasis on how much depends on making the unconscious conscious!

I want particularly to mention Freud’s boldly saying that real life provides no model for the analyst’s mode of response (p. 166). Here he seemed to mean more than the analysand’s not responding in kind to the analysand, that is, not meeting hate with hate or hate with love and love...
not entering into lengthy discussions of analysis with the analysand. He also meant a way of listening and understanding, and an appreciation of analytic meaning and value in everything that comes up, however negative its superficial appearance. One may say that Freud took an affirmative view of every phenomenon in the analysis. To say this is not equivalent to saying that he was blind to the potential for destroying the analysis contained in the various forms of resistance, including transference and acting out. With regard to these destructive potentials, he did not assume a pollyana role or a position of omnipotence. But unwaveringly he expressed his affirmative attitude through his confidence in the ultimate intelligibility of human activity. One may hope to develop a sense, or more likely a complex network of meanings, for everything in the analysis, even that which is most disruptive and apparently nonanalytic or antianalytic in appearance. This affirmative constituent of the analytic attitude must play a great part in building the analysand’s sense of safety, for it establishes that he or she is totally welcome in the analytic relationship and that the analyst not only sits but stands behind the analysand.

Some Comments on Freud’s Discussion of Technique

DISCLAIMED ACTION IN THE DISCUSSION OF RESISTANCE

In contrast to the way Freud described the relatives of analysands as people who may be expected to do a great deal to undermine the analysand’s relation to the analyst (p. 120), Freud consistently described the analysand’s own opposition to the work of analysis as work done not by a person but by “the resistance.” For example, he referred frequently to how the resistance uses the transference for its own purposes. Similarly, he said the resistance follows the analysis step by step. In this respect he presented resistance in the same way that analysands often do, that is, as a species of disclaimed action—as a happening or as an alien force to be conquered at best or submitted to at worst, rather than as a personally intended activity. Elsewhere, in an earlier discussion of resistance (1973), I have discussed it as unconscious personal action rather than as force or mechanism operating impersonally and autonomously (see also chapters 6–10).

It is, however, suggested by a few of Freud’s remarks that in the

clinical crunch he would have been inclined to deal with the resistance by interpreting it as unconsciously performed action. For instance, in his interpretations of resistance, he tended to link it with defiance of the father. Also, he took it as an expression of the analysand’s dread of the unconscious material against which it is directed. In these respects he was viewing the analysand as a person who resists rather than as a locale of the operation of an impersonal process called “the resistance.” Why, then, this discrepancy? Perhaps it was necessary for Freud, at least in his formal exposition of technique, to present resistance as an impersonal and autonomous force or mechanism with which the analysand, along with the analyst, must reckon. Whether knowingly or not, he may have had to do so during the time of his pioneering work in order to reinforce his empathy and extend his tolerance, for at that time his confidence in his own analytic attitude and method could not have been altogether secure. Both his own emotional safety and the protection of his new method and his analysands were at stake.

Be this as it may, Freud continued his implicit disclaiming of personal action when he attributed much of the resistance to the tenacious claims of infantile unconscious wishes. These wishes will not give up the gratifications they obtain through symptoms and character traits and blind repetition (see, for example, pp. 103 and 108). Yet, even though this theoretical lodging of power in the independently demanding wish rather than the wishful person further encourages a view of the analysand as an apparatus which is beset by resistance rather than as a person who is resisting, there is again reason to think that in practice Freud was inclined to refer to what the analysand wished rather than to the wish as autonomous agent in its own right. It was just that this way of thinking did not qualify as scientific in Freud’s estimation, and perhaps additionally it supported his accepting attitude toward the difficulties presented by the analysand.

One can appreciate how, for a time, this disclaiming orientation does help analysands follow the fundamental rule with some sense of safety, thinking that they are studying how their minds work rather than how they live their lives, albeit largely unconsciously. They are in this respect consciously relieved of a frightening sense of responsibility, a responsibility they slowly and erratically assume with the progress of their analyses. But it must also be remembered that not every analysand progresses this way, and it may well be that one of the hindrances to working through to an appropriate sense of responsibility may be the reinforcement of disclaimers by the mechanistic
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terminology of metapsychology and its penetration into the analytic dialogue.

EDUCATIVE ASPECTS OF ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

As I mentioned in the second section of my review of the technical papers, Freud presented analysis mostly as a matter of finding out the exact nature of the analysand’s problems, the forms in which these will be accessible to interpretation and modification, and the individualized goals of the analytic process itself. True, he did make occasional unelaborated references to educating the analysand—for example, as to the fact of resistance—and he did speak of compelling the development of the transference neurosis by consistent transference interpretation. It is true, therefore, that in these respects he presented analysis as a process that cannot be pure exploration. Still, the view was encouraged that analysis is a naively empirical method. His metaphor of the analyst as mirror reflecting back only what is shown, neglecting as it does the transformational nature of analytic interventions, epitomizes this positivist stance, as does his recommendation that one should work without presuppositions (pp. 113–114).

It must, however, be recognized that Freud was always following certain lines of interpretation and construction in his establishing of “the facts” of the case. These were the lines that led to the full definition of the Oedipus complex, ambivalence, psychosexual stages of development, unconsciously guilty and anxious activity, and the intricacies of the entire family drama of early childhood, including birth of siblings and primal scene. Even the fostering of the development of the transference neurosis implies a shaping of the phenomena to be interpreted. This approach provides the analyst with a useful set of selective and organizing principles. These principles define the best form of material to deal with as well as a special slant on the implications of whatever the analysand does bring up under these conditions.

Consequently, the frequently observed neglect by analysts of adequate interpretation of transference need not be a matter of their missing the point altogether or ineptly finding nothing to interpret. The analyst can always attend exclusively to other aspects of the complex material in question, such as its developmental aspects, and can, in principle, always claim validity for these interventions. But what these alternative interventions so often lack is the immediate or long-range transformational efficacy of transference interpretation. For example, genetic or developmental material, however illuminating it may be, in

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often presented by the analysand as an escape from exploring transfer-
ence (for example, displacement from the analyst to the parents), and
the analyst who takes up such “past” material on its own terms, while
not factually wrong, may be technically quite wrong and may further
complicate the analysis of resistance and transference. But the main
point I am making is not so much technical as epistemological. Ana-
lytic material always lends itself to multiple interpretation and is pro-
gressively shaped by the analyst’s interventions.

Consequently, it seems appropriate to modify the conception of
analysis as a purely exploratory or naively empirical procedure. It now
seems more exact to say that, as Freud presented it, analysis is a matter
of finding out how certain expectable and therapeutically crucial vari-
ables have figured in the development of a neurosis or character prob-
lem and its extension into resisting and transference. These expectable
variables include the psychosexual phases of development in which
current problems are anchored, the events to which they are tied, the
unconscious fantasizing through which they remain continuing influ-
ences, the importance of all these variables relative to one another,
and the accidental influences of life which, after the distinctive evolu-
tion of these psychosexual variables, have been used to give them
their final form.

On this view, psychoanalysis emerges as an educative investigation,
and one can accept that it is not paradoxical to call it that. Variations
of analytic method and attitude represent different forms of educative
investigation. Because it is educative or supervised in this respect, it
shapes the phenomena to be analyzed, and it selectively accentuates
and organizes them. So long as it remains within the bounds of rea-
son, each analytic approach tends to be self-confirming, and its results
cannot be easily compared to those obtained differently. This episte-
omological issue will be taken up in various places in the remainder of
this book.

SAFETY

Let us return more directly to the theme of safety. There is no need
to detail the many ways in which analysands will press for simple,
magically effective interpretations or other interventions during the
course of analysis; nor need it be emphasized how much they suffer
consciously in response to the analyst’s not yielding to this pressure—
 Though often they are relieved, too. At the same time, analytic experi-
ence makes it plain that, with the progress of an analysis, and particu-

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larly as analysis moves toward termination, the analysand gets to appreciate how vital it always was that the analyst maintain the neutral analytic attitude, particularly in view of the atmosphere of safety that has been progressively, even if unstably, engendered thereby. If, as Freud described and I have emphasized, the analyst has been consistently, even if only implicitly, indicating his or her recognition of the difficulty of changing, the complexity and ambiguity connected with changing, the importance of a disciplined approach as well as an empathic one, and an abiding confidence in the analytic method and in both parties to the analytic relationship, then he or she has done all it is possible to do to establish and foster the atmosphere of safety in the analysis and to lay the groundwork for reestablishing it every time it is lost.

In turn, this proposition implies that analysands do recognize, at least in a rudimentary preconscious way, that this analytic attitude is a prerequisite of their taking the many chances that have to be taken in the course of adhering to the requirements of the analytic method. In this sense it emerges that these requirements are jointly defined, even though it requires the effectiveness of the analysis itself to make it plain that, all along, the analysand has had a vital stake in requiring the work to be done in this way. Were this not so, the analysand could not take on what he or she ventures to confront during the analysis, and instead would continue simply to feel injured, betrayed, threatened, seduced, or otherwise interfered with or traumatized. In other words, every significant lapse from the analytic attitude supports the analysand's expectation that it is dangerous to go any further with the work.

It is widely recognized that such lapses on the analyst's part cannot be altogether avoided. It is also widely recognized that the disruptive effects of these lapses can often be counteracted and even on occasion put to good analytic use, through self-analysis of countertransference by the analyst and through analysis of the analysand's responses to the lapses once they have been identified and perhaps confirmed by the analyst. For the moment, however, what matters is our recognizing the impact of these lapses on the atmosphere of safety that is fostered by the well-maintained analytic attitude.

Finally, there is this to be added to this discussion of safety. When Freud wrote his papers on technique, he had not yet systematically named, described, and arranged in developmental sequence the prototypical danger situations: loss of the object, loss of the object's love, castration, and superego condemnation (Freud, 1926; see also chapter 7)

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herein). Today, we would want to extend and better integrate this list to include, from the side of ego development, the dangers of loss of self-cohesion and loss of differentiation of the self from the object. These dangers are somehow implied not only by those that Freud described, but also by the primal traumatic state which, for Freud, was the ultimate referent of all danger situations. All of these dangers may be experienced in the analytic situation, and it is an essential part of analysis to analyze the infantile psychical reality they imply and the way they appear in the analysand's dread of the analyst and resistance against developing and exploring the relationship to him or her. Ultimately, the analysis of infantile danger situations is the most potent factor in establishing an atmosphere of safety. Nevertheless, the carrying through of this analysis of danger situations depends greatly on the analyst's readiness to conduct the analysis in such a way as to foster and sustain the atmosphere of safety against which the infantile fantasies may be crystallized, expressed, and tested. I am suggesting that we deal with a benign circle in this respect.

It is this step-by-step construction of a safe analysis, as described above, that establishes what has come to be called the therapeutic alliance. I have not mentioned the therapeutic alliance before this because it is my impression that in too many clinical discussions that concept is used in a nonanalytic way. That is to say, it is used in a way that denies the transferential elements of this alliance, or, if not that, then it is used in a way that tends to minimize the interpretive work required to establish and maintain the type of alliance without which an adequate analysis is impossible. But having said so, I will add in conclusion my recognition that, in one respect, this chapter may be read correctly as a contribution to the theory of the therapeutic alliance (Zetzel, 1965).
The Psychoanalyst's Empathic Activity

Introduction

Do psychoanalysts empathize with their analysands in a more sensitive, complex, sustained manner than they do with others in their nonanalytic personal relationships? In "The Metapsychology of the Analyt" (1942), Robert Fliess assumed that they do. In that paper he characterized the analyst's "work ego" as capable of special feats of empathizing. This capability is based on a permissive, work-justified, adaptive realignment of the analyst's superego relations with his or her ego. And this realignment allows the "work ego" to experience a great array of feelings and fantasies in relation to the analysand which might otherwise be experienced as inappropriate and reprehensible and therefore effectively blocked by the ego's usual defensive measures.

With Fliess, I believe that often, even if not always, analysts do empathize more freely and reliably in the analytic situation than they do in nonanalytic situations. But I also believe that the explanation of this discrepancy is more complex than the one proposed by Fliess and that it is amenable to profitable discussion in nonmetapsychological terms. Consequently, with the help of action language, I shall attempt in this chapter to develop further the psychology of the analyst's empathic activity, from here on to be designated empathizing. Although empathizing will remain the focus throughout, the following discussion should, owing to its wide range, also develop further the idea of the analytic attitude. No effort will be made to maintain a sharp line between empathizing and the analytic attitude as a whole, of which empathizing is a constituent. The cost in precision will be offset, I believe, by the gain in evocativeness and significance.

There exists now an extensive literature on the analyst's empathiz-
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various confusions. For example, confusions between empathizing and sympathizing or pitying, between the analyst's empathizing and empathizing in the great variety of ordinary human relationships, between empathizing implicitly and explicitly, between one's own empathizing as an analyst and that of other analysts, and between the origins or infantile prototypes of empathizing and its technical forms in analytic work. Additional risks include dwelling on disruptive influences on empathizing instead of on empathizing proper; and they include as well sentimentally limiting the contents of empathizing only to those emotional experiences that are, in one or another sense, usually considered "good" things to undergo in analysis, such as hopelessness and hope, conflict and mastery, and shame and joy, while forgetting about empathizing with avariciousness, overweening pride, sociopathy, sadism, and the like. Empathizing with the struggles against these tendencies, yes; with the tendencies themselves, no. Can it be correct to think that the latter instances of empathizing are always and only based on countertransferences or pathological identifications with the analysand? I think not. I once discussed a similar issue and came to a similar conclusion in the case of the analytic psychology of ideals, ideal self, or the ego ideal. Psychoanalytic writers on this topic have tended to focus on lofty ideals and to neglect ideals, such as toughness, of a more earthy or even antisocial nature (Schafer, 1967).

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS

There is a general consensus among psychoanalytic contributors to our topic that empathizing must be understood as an activity with complex cognitive aspects. (That empathizing has an emotional side is true by definition and so is taken as self-evident when the cognitive aspects are being articulated.) These cognitive aspects include the analyst's (1) constructing a mental model of the analysand, (2) being alert to his or her own "signal affects" and shared fantasies in response to the analysand's associations, and (3) being prepared to use these responses reflectively as cues to the emotional aspects and the significance of the analysand's activity in the analysis.

These cognitive elements, which include response to nonverbal as well as verbal cues or messages, have been considered to arise out of trial, segregated, partial, and transient identifications with the analysand. On their part, these identifications come about through projective and introjective processes or imagined merging of self and object.

The Psychoanalyst's Empathic Activity

In this, the analyst utilizes memories of personal experiences of a sort similar to the analysand's. The entire process may be described as one variant of regression in the service of the ego (Kris, 1952). And for the regression to take place smoothly and productively, it would seem to require, as Fleiss pointed out, a relaxation of the analyst's superego standards. Superego relaxation may be needed not just for the content but for the meaning in psychic reality of the very act of empathizing. For, unconsciously, the process of empathizing may be invested by analysand and analyst alike with the meaning of nursing, seducing, and penetrating, invading the object's body and robbing it of its contents, and other such archaisms. However, acute superego conflict will not arise for the analyst to the extent that these meanings are subordinated to others of a more neutral sort, such as their being means to the ends of understanding and therapeutic and generative benefit rather than their remaining primarily and cruelly libidinal and aggressive. Among the previous contributors whose work I have been briefly summarizing, in addition to Fleiss (1942) and myself (1959, 1964), are Knight (1940), Kris (1952), Greenenson (1960), Kohut (1971, 1977), and Arlow and Beres (1974).

FACTORS IN THE ANALYST'S EMOTIONAL POSITION WHICH WILL FACILITATE EMPATHIZING

What is it that facilitates the analyst's special feats of empathizing? Why is the analyst in his or her work, as compared to many nonanalytic relationships, relatively more relaxed, poised, and patient; less easily gullible, bewildered, or stimulated to be mistrustful, irritable, judgmental, or helpless; more curious, tolerant of ambiguity and lack of closure, and working with a keener sense of the relevance of what is said from one moment to the next or one day, week, or month to the next; less inclined to form transferences and mount resistances readily, intensely, enduringly, and unreflectively; and readier to enter with no great trepidation into moments of extraordinary analytic intimacy of feeling, imagining, remembering, and anticipating?

I am sure many examples will "come to your mind" of analysts whose usual analytic competence and effectiveness you would not seriously doubt and yet who, in their nonanalytic relationships, including those with colleagues, seem to be one or more of the following: rigid, aloof, irritable, ruthlessly controlling, egotistic, flamboyant, shut in, timid, obsessional, paranoid, depressive, or hypomanic. Some would say that these analysts might be able to work well up to a point

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but be unable to carry their analyses through to optimal terminations. But to be realistic about it and also for heuristic purposes, I think it best to suspend judgment on this matter; for how many competent analysts come across as paragons of normality to those who know them best in their private lives?

Among the factors that have been said to facilitate the analyst’s relatively secure and complex empathizing at work, the following seem to stand out. For the analyst, less is at stake personally in that the analytic relationship is not the repository of his or her major personal needs other than those directly involved in the subjective importance of working well as an analyst. Also, the analyst gets to know so much about certain intimate and crucial details of the analysand’s life (for example, masturbatory practices and fantasies, transgressions and abuses of various kinds, long-smoldering resentments, etc.—and the conflictedness of it all!). Additionally, the analyst is not constrained to respond overtly in the ordinary social way and so may, and usually will, defer response while sorting out what is essential, timely, basic, or authentic, and is able on this basis to remain narcissistically and defensively secure and emotionally finely tuned. The analyst’s primary responsibility is to formulate interpretations at appropriate times and to respond in kind to what the analysand is bringing up. Further, as well as benefiting from a superego-sanctioned “work ego,” the analyst can rely on what may be called a “work superego,” one which, through training and identification with teachers, prohibits nontechnical erotic and hostile intimacies and thereby eases the strain on, and expands the limits of, ego functioning. Additionally, the analyst, through personal analysis and supervision, has weathered confrontations with regressive shifts of functioning and the primitive erotic and hostile pressures that will be experienced in regressive contexts. And finally, the analyst is protected by the knowledge that the specialized arm of closeness that intensifies during an analysis will abate with its termination.

Owing to factors of these various sorts, the analyst in relation to the analysand will be less disposed than he or she would be otherwise to act ambivalently and anxiously and to introduce distortions. The analyst will need much less to be loved and cared for, less to be empathized with and appreciated, vicariously fulfilled or victimized, and so on. Occupying this relatively informed and disinterested position, the analyst is better prepared to work sensitively, generously, and reliably.

It has also been suggested that one must like someone in order to empathize with him or her. But as there are many kinds of liking, “liking” is too complex a topic to be taken for granted. Furthermore, I would suggest that a strong case can be made for the view that liking of any sort is based on empathizing rather than being its product. And perhaps an even stronger case can be made that liking and empathizing ordinarily contribute to one another in a benign circle.

The portrait I have sketched of the informed, disinterested, and empathetic analyst is not an idealization. It has been presented here to serve as an ideal form with reference to which one may hope to explain the typically observed discrepancy I mentioned between the competent analyst’s analytic and nonanalytic relationships. (As Cooper [1982] has pointed out with respect to what is ordinarily called “good character,” many analysts show more of it in their work than otherwise—a discrepancy of the same sort which concerns us here.) Sketching this portrait is also the last part of my introduction to the points which I particularly want to consider at length: mental models, analytic modifications of modes of action, fictive aspects of the analytic relationship, and transformational against imitative aspects of the analyst’s empathizing. It is in these four respects that I shall be attempting to add something to the already rich and clinically useful literature on our topic.

Constructing Models of the Analysand

To begin to consider the analyst’s construction of mental models, one must first of all disregard certain positivistic assumptions, namely that subject and object are distinct entities; that there is a single, unambiguously knower emotional reality with which to empathize; and that empathizing may therefore be judged simply right or wrong on the basis of objective criteria that exist free of theoretical presuppositions and interpretive grasp of context. If empathizing requires the analyst to construct a mental model or idea of the analysand to use as a framework or guide, then the analyst can only be empathizing with the analysand as he or she exists in this constructed model. That is to say, for the analyst the analysand is not someone who is somehow objectively knowable outside this model, whatever its nature. As an analyst, one empathizes with one’s idea of the analysand. Certainly, over the course of an analysis, the analyst’s
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of the analyst's Freudian way of making sense in the terms of infantile psychosexuality and other familiar variables. It is no joke—it is, in fact, an epistemological necessity—that Freudian analysts get Freudian material from their analysands while Jungians and others get other material, material not altogether different, to be sure, but different enough to require much careful reflection before one attempts to pass judgment on the superiority of one school over another simply on the basis of what the "facts" are.

Heinz Kohut, for example, essentially and necessarily tends to put in parentheses detailed exploration of the origins of various kinds of polymorphously perverse phenomena. He does so by regarding these phenomena as "disintegration products" (1977). In his writings, he is more interested in the factors that precipitate the disturbances of the cohesive self, which then produce these disintegration products, than he is in these products themselves. And one precipitating factor that he emphasizes again and again is empathic failure on the analyst's part that repeats similar, real or imagined failures on the part of the analysand's parents during early childhood. On this basis, Kohut not only organizes a model of the analysand to be empathized with, he also helps bring into being within the analytic situation a rich array of further phenomena. These phenomena then seem quite naturally to fill in critical aspects of the narcissistic or self-representational and self-experiential aspects of the analysand's development and disturbance. The vicissitudes of "selfobject" transferences reign supreme.

With Kohut, I believe that mainstream Freudians usually do not and cannot develop material of this kind in as great variety and in similar detail as he does. Consequently, for these Freudians the explanatory value of empathic interaction as a developmental and technical necessity, though it has always been affirmed and emphasized in one fashion or another, has never been the same or as prominent as it is in Kohut's scheme of things. On the other hand, Freudians have much more to say than Kohutians about such variables as, for example, formative bodily experiences and object love, variables that are themselves constituents of models which mediate differently focused acts of empathizing. This more traditional universe of analytic phenomena is just not the same as Kohut's. And so, in the end, it cannot be a question of one set of claims being simply right and the other simply wrong; nor can it be a matter of the phenomena being natural or analytic in the one case and artificial or nonanalytic in the other. Comparative assessments of the two approaches can only be carried out in terms of more or less integrated systems of assumptions, concepts,
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methods, and the phenomena defined in and generated by each type of analysis. Kohut’s attempt at comparative analysis of this sort—his report of the two analyses of Mr. Z (1979)—is unsatisfactory in this respect. Among other problems, there seems to be, in the first “Freudian” analysis, little of the empathizing with which I am familiar in traditional analyses, including those that I have carried out myself. Additionally, Kohut presents his argument in purely empirical terms rather than in more appropriate systematic-methodological terms, a failing that I have discussed elsewhere (1980a).

A second set of factors involved in the analyst’s construction of the analytic model of the analysand may now be taken up. In the analytic situation, the analyst never does see the analysand in his or her entirety. This is so because analysands, in fashioning their self-presentation, are always responding to the current structure of their analytic situations, to their own shifting aims, and to their analysand’s modes of thinking and responding. Analysts do not, for example, always see the full range of the analysand’s charm, wit, verbal facility, or their capacity to bear responsibility, assume leadership, or win love. In some cases they see very little of any of this, at least for a long time. Indeed, when the analysand’s mode of resisting is of a certain kind, the analyst may be the last to see characteristics of this sort. In other cases the analyst can extrapolate with some confidence from whatever it is that is allowed to show in the analytic situation. Still, it is extrapolation in these cases. Many psychological studies have shown that, to a variable extent, behavior is a function of situations and relationships. In terms of their mode of understanding, analysts may include under “behavior” all that analysands unconsciously and repetitively enact in forming and revising transferences and in resisting over the course of the analytic work.

Analysts deal therefore with what may be called the analysand’s organization and presentation of a second self. Of course, this second self necessarily amounts to a version of what the analysand presents in nonclinical relationships. It cannot be viewed otherwise. Psychoanalytic work presupposes this continuity. But the guiding principle that these selves must be continuous with one another does not show that they are identical, that they are equally accessible, or that it is only their sameness that counts. Freud came at this problem from the opposite direction when he noted that analysts see aspects of analysands that others never see.

If all this is so, if follows that the model of the analysand that is constructed is essentially a model of this second self, that is to say, the

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self in analysis with a particular analyst. And the changes that are observed and facilitated take place in the realm embraced by the model being used. All the analyst can ever know for sure is the analysand as his or her own analysand, and that is a lot to know and of no small beneficial consequence. My emphasis here is on what may be called the fictive aspect of the analytic relationship, an aspect to which I shall return in several places. (It is, I believe, an emphasis that is consistent with Freud’s on the artificial aspect of the transference neurosis [Freud, 1914a], though it is not on that account consistent with Freud’s usual positivist stance toward his “data.”)

It is important to add that what is known, that is, the models that are developed, are evident primarily in what analysts do as analysts and not in what they say they do or say they believe. The analyst’s consciously rendered accounts of his or her analytic beliefs and performances may involve self-misunderstanding. Thus, it is a generally accepted principle that analytic supervisors must be alert to such self-misunderstanding on the part of supervisees. But any account of what the analyst does do as analyst can only be developed coherently and instructively in the terms of a system of psychoanalytic thought and practice. Psychoanalytic narratives are system-bound.

To sum up this lengthy set of considerations: depending on many factors, including but not limited to interrelated theoretical and technical preferences, the cognitive models of analysands will vary and, varying with them, the occasions, forms, uses, and analyzable meanings of the analyst’s empathizing. In the analytic situation, empathizing is not a cognitively innocent or naïve activity, nor is it altogether comprehensive. Consequently, one cannot elucidate this activity well if, positivistically, one insists on a sharp distinction between subject and object and, with that, on the existence of facts or phenomena that are theory-free, method-free, and narratively complete.

The Analyst’s Second Self

Turning now to the analyst, I propose that he or she, too, operates through what may be called the organization and presentation of a second self. Here, I return to my opening observations of the qualitative and quantitative differences between personal nonanalytic empathizing and analytic empathizing. Briefly, many analysts seem to be peo-
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ple who are not as much at ease and open to give-and-take in ordinary life situations as they are in the analytic situation.

I wish to emphasize next that this second self presented by the analyst is analogous to the second self (or “implied author”) presented by creative writers. There are many writers, whether poets or novelists, who, from what is known about them, seem to be above average in their everyday misery, cruelty, greed, egocentricity, snobbery, self-destructiveness, and sociopathy. Nevertheless, these men and women may achieve in their writings the most sublime versions of emotional experience of every kind. Though they are not angels, they write like angels. At their best they make us wish we were like them—or that we had them for friends, parents, or lovers. But in responding so appreciatively, we are thinking in fact of authorial second selves, and we are recklessly creating an illusion (an arbitrary mental model) of what these writers are as social beings—tender, witty, compassionate, brave, heart-rendingly empathic.

It is possible to conceptualize these observations concerning analysts and authors in the metapsychological terms of psychic structure. One would have to say that there is a second psychic structure available to the analyst and creative writer alike. This second structure would be similar to what Robert Fliess (1942) called the analyst’s work ego. And one would have to think that analyst and writer can shift from one structure to another, as required. But if psychic structure is so much a function of situation and task orientation, such as writing a love poem or conducting an analysis, then its generalized fixity—its very structuredness—is thrown into question. Here, ego psychologists encounter a serious difficulty.

A partial explanation of the phenomena with which we are now concerned was proposed by Kris (1952) under the heading of “regression in the service of the ego.” This regression makes possible the inspirational phases of work (relaxation of defense, openness to archaic experience, etc.). In the end, according to Kris, these phases must be succeeded and modified by elaborational phases (critical scrutiny, reworking, selection, synthesis, etc.). But Kris’s discussion does not authorize one to view these regressively “inspired” phases romantically as wildly creative chaos. Writers consistently work within traditions. They are working in terms of traditions even when they are revolutionizing them. To the extent that they are working, their regressive phases are best understood as those of writers, not as those of analysts or dreamers. Like empathizing, creative writing is in this respect no innocent activity; it is thoroughly informed by existing systems of

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thought as these have been embodied in literary and other writings, past and present, including the author’s own previous work. As an art historian of some merit, Kris knew all this; however, he was writing primarily for analysts, and so he devoted most of his discussion of inspiration to primary process modes of function and to infantile fantasy and wish fulfillment, such as oral and respiratory incorporation. On this account he sometimes seemed implicitly to be endorsing a naively romantic view of the matter—the very opposite of what he was depicting—equating inspiration with simple primitization. In the same way, empathizing, like any analytic regression that is truly in the service of the ego, is informed in large part by the tradition of doing analysis.

Because I have for some time been exploring alternatives to the metapsychological mode of discourse, I would not now conceptualize these activities in the terms of multiple or self-modifying psychic structures. I now prefer the terms of action and stable patterning of action. I have explored the usefulness of this metatheoretical option in a number of previous discussions (1976, 1978; see also below, chapters 6–10). And on this account I have been using “empathizing” in preference to “empathy.” I use the term “action” in a broad sense that includes more than motor activity; it takes in any goal-directed performance such as thinking in all its forms and the cognitive aspects of behaving emotionally. It covers whatever in ordinary language we could say someone does (for example, walk, talk, remember, repress). As yet, however, we understand imperfectly the mediating actions by which analysts and writers organize and present these second selves that can be so different from, even if not thoroughly discontinuous with, their everyday selves. I shall now go on to offer some reflections on these mediating actions.

Perhaps the most important feature of the analyst’s second self is the analyst’s affirmative orientation. This feature is highlighted particularly by Kohut whose psychology of the self is consistently growth oriented. Highlighting, however, is not the same as discovering. Freud (1923) had already pointed in this direction in his accounts of the embattled ego’s striving for mastery. Hartmann (1939, 1950, 1951) had advanced in this direction in his discussions of adaptation. I (1959) had stressed the generative aspects of the analyst’s empathy; and others had made similar contributions.

What is this affirmative orientation? One way of describing it is to say that in empathizing, the analyst assumes, at least implicitly, that whatever the analysand is doing or experiencing, it is what it is essen-
that he or she do under the extremely adverse circumstances that prevail unconsciously or in "psychical reality." These adverse circumstances center on the terrifying infantile danger situations that Freud described broadly in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926), namely, total loss of the love object, total loss of love, castration, and archaic and crushing superego punishment. Behind these dangers, Freud claimed, lies the primal or traumatic anxiety state of infantile helplessness. We might now want to add the following dangers to this list, perhaps as components of primal anxiety or of total loss of the object: paranoid terror, depressive helplessness, fragmentation of the self, and loss of self in a de differentiation of self and object, all of which would to some extent be understood unconsciously in terms of devouring and self-annihilation, and all of which could certainly be counted as ultimate narcissistic shocks.

In creating analytic experience affirmatively, the analyst steadily recognizes that the analysand has unconsciously carried these dangers into the present and continues to impose them arbitrarily on the present or at least to exaggerate present dangers in terms of infantile dangers. Consequently, the analysand is viewed as living in dread, continuously anticipating or experiencing actual or potential agonizing conflict and loss. And in seeing the analysand as doing what it seems essential to do under these psychically real conditions, the analyst does not turn pollyanna and see the analysand as just wanting to love and be loved in the ordinary sense; rather, the analyst works with a tragic vision of human development and existence (Schafer, 1970). (This is not Kohut's idea of "tragic man" as a victim of lack of empathy, an idea that violates the entire critical tradition of the sense of the tragic as conflictual.) With this tragic vision, the Freudian analyst understands that intransigent mistrust and negativism, discouraging rigidity and inertia, relentless triviality and grandiosity, or apparently unmodifiable resisting of some other sort, are costly means of coping with the infantile dangers which we have all experienced and which we continue to recreate in our present lives. Unconsciously, we repeatedly enact infantile dangers and security measures.

Let me here return to the claim that "nothing human is alien to me." This claim may be made legitimately by any analyst who is not altogether unprepared for the psychoanalytic encounter, provided at least that this encounter is understood in terms of danger situations and traumatic anxiety, and the repetitive and formidable forms of resisting (and transference) to which they give rise. The claim requires only a shift to a higher level of abstraction than that occupied by the analysand's concrete accounts. Specific dangers and responses to them, of course, vary from person to person, but typical dangers (for example, object loss) and responses have been delineated in fine detail. Unconsciously we are all members of an endangered community. Here is a basis for the analyst's appropriately identifying with the analysand in the partial, circumspect, empathic way that sustains and enhances good will toward the analysand and good work with him or her.

Notwithstanding this community of experience, the concrete definitions of danger and the disturbed modes of coping with it are not to be ignored. Even though these, too, may be shared to some degree by all analysts, they are not shared equally, and they are not utilized in the same way by all analysts. Here is where analysts differ from one another in empathic range and tolerance. Some can empathize with sociopathy better than others who, in turn, may empathize more fully with depression, while yet others know anxiety inside out. But in general, although each analyst may be prepared to view some things more affirmatively than others, all analysts, to the extent that they remain more or less consistently affirmative in their orientation, actualize the empathic second self.

Another aspect of the affirmative self is the analyst's following Freud in assuming coherence and potential intelligibility in everything the analysand brings up or refrains from bringing up. The analyst is prepared to see the analysand as a meaningful totality, that is, as someone whose actions require constant life-historical and contemporaneous cross-referencing in order to be defined most exactly through their mutual implications. Unlike analysands, analysts do not believe in randomness, nor do they believe in major or total personal incoherence and discontinuity. In the analysand's beliefs there is much magic, fragmentation, denial, timelessness, and negativity. In the analyst's beliefs, to the contrary, there is much affirmation.

To the extent that analysts approach the ideal implied in "nothing human is alien to me," that is, to the extent that they unflinchingly recognize and accept that unconsciously carried forward infantile danger and coping are part of the human condition, they remain, relatively speaking, narcissistically secure. This is to say that they will not likely wish desperately to establish omnipotent control, nor will they resort readily to mutually destructive strategies of helplessness and discontinuity. Remaining within the fairly strict limits required
by neutrality, they will tend to work honestly, bravely, patiently, and nonjudgmentally. To use the terms tragic and ironic in the sense I have presented elsewhere (1970), I would say that the analyst will envision reality tragically, tempering this vision with the ironic realization that the danger situations, being conceived in infantile terms, are both fantastic and potentially modifiable. And as a further manifestation of these cohesive and affirmative and ultimately neutral modes of action, the analyst will manifest stamina.

It is worth spending some time on the concept of stamina. (In action terms, one might speak of empathizing sturdily, steadfastly, and patiently.) Like affirmativeness, stamina is a central feature of the analyst's second self. Analysts need stamina like they need oxygen. This is not only because they may be putting in long days or seeing very disturbed analysands. These facts of an analyst's life are, of course, important, but there is more. It is hard work to move empathically with analysands through their ranges of affective experience—or in some cases to live with their paucity of affective experience over long stretches of time. Human beings are not built to do so much improvising of the analytic second selves appropriate to different analysands. Empathically improvising different modes of organizing experience always makes for some identity diffusion. And although some of us analysts seem to forget that we, too, are human beings and not gods or machines, we all do need constantly to recreate the experience of self-cohesiveness and self-consistency. The analyst must therefore monitor his or her sense of being integrated or "together" while at work and must be prepared to carry out whatever self-analysis is indicated, not only to stay in good repair but to modify analytic activity appropriately (for example, by slowing down the pace or taking greater distance from the clinical interaction). Those analysts who maintain cohesiveness securely are not so endangered or confused by empathic excursions. Those analysts have stamina.

A second major factor making for the second self's stamina is anticipation. No matter what the analysand might confront the analyst with, it will have less shock value if the analyst works with a frame of reference that helps him or her anticipate, from the cues provided by the analysand and by self-understanding, the sorts of things that might happen next. The analyst's own personal analysis is essential in this respect. Other help derives from clinical supervision and experience, moderated therapeutic zeal, and a reasonably integrated, clinically rooted theory or system of concepts. Intelligence also helps, for one of the signs of intelligence is the capacity to anticipate, which is to say, the capacity to establish and apply on appropriate occasions patternings of expectation. These patternings are essential aspects of what is meant when it is said that, in empathizing, the analyst forms a mental model of the analysand. In one fundamental sense, the model is a pattern of expectations. With it, the analyst is like a good tennis player who always seems to be waiting for the ball rather than scrambling after it and getting worn down.

But it is literature rather than tennis that should concern us here. I would say that in this regard the analyst is in a position analogous to that of an informed reader of literature, one with what has been called interpretive competence (Culler, 1975). Competent readers recognize the genre, the historical period, the formal constraints and opportunities of one or another type of literature. They do not approach a Cavalier poet, a Romantic poet, and a Symbolist poet with the same expectations, nor do they read in the same way a lyric, an epic, and an occasional piece, when all three have been written within the same tradition. In clinical analyses, too, the patternings of expectation vary from analysand to analysand and from context to context, and varying with them are the forms and degrees of analytic activity. Interpretive competence reduces the likelihood that, repeatedly, the analyst will be emotionally shocked or overextended and so suffer a loss of stamina.

One of the most important and frequent shocks the analyst must anticipate is the analysand's attacks on empathizing. In part, sometimes in large part, analysands fear being empathized with and so they attack the very thing they long for (Kohut puts his own sort of special emphasis on this point): Empathizing that is recognized as such stirs up conscious hope when, defensively, none is wanted. Being the object of empathizing can be disturbingly overstimulating especially when, consciously or unconsciously, the analysand invests it with erotic significance, perhaps homosexual or castrating significance. Being empathized with can intensify feelings of worthlessness or overwhelming indebtedness. And it can be deadening when the antagonistic analysand feels disarmed by it. I am not now speaking of conspicuous or heavy-handed shows of empathic power, many of which are, by common agreement, altogether misguided. The attacks in question are on the very possibility of being empathized with and on the empathizing that is an implicit component of any sensitive intervention—or nonintervention. Coolness can be as empathically appropriate in some clinical contexts as compassion is in others. For the
most part, however, I shall be referring in what follows to empathizing of the more compassionate sort.

Technically, the analyst cannot always anticipate—and will not insist on always being able to anticipate!—just how any explicit act of empathizing will be taken. It is, however, usually possible to analyze such disturbing reactions to analytic empathizing as feeling misunderstood, smothered, seduced, pressured to repress rage or anxiety, or invaded. It is perhaps best to think of these disturbing interventions as instances of incomplete empathizing, provided that they are not evidently inappropriate in context or countertransference. Being prepared in the individual case to learn about empathizing while engaging in it, the analyst does not put the second self under the strain of being a know-it-all. Instead, the analyst maintains the proper focus on the vicissitudes of the analytic relationship.

Looking at attacks on empathizing from another angle, one sees that analysands often are unprepared to empathize with themselves. This unpreparedness may be based on a disposition to react guiltily or ashamedly and a correlated reactive policy of asceticism (Schafer, 1964). Being thus unprepared, these analysands may take the analyst’s empathizing as an unwelcome stimulus to go easy on themselves, become self-pitying, or even become grandiose. Or else they may be afraid they will cry out their strangulated grief forever or become incontinent or do something equally disastrous. That analysands fear such developments is well known to psychoanalytic clinicians, though its relevance to self-empathizing may not be widely appreciated. As an aspect of his or her second self, the analyst is prepared to empathize with these dilemmas, too.

In yet another respect, analysands often fear empathizing with the analyst. They may prefer the posture of nonsentimentality, detachment, aloofness, or being the efficient, self-sufficient, properly self-absorbed patient. What they then dread is this, that from their end rather than the analyst’s all the difficult issues of otherness, closeness, guilt, repairation, voyeurism, and envy and gratitude might be introduced into the analytic setting by their responding empathically to the analyst who, on occasion, will seem to them, and perhaps be, confused, troubled, ill, elated, or depressed. Good reality testing is often implicit in the analysand’s way of perceiving the analyst, and the analyst’s readiness to self-empathize is needed to make it clear that for the analysand conflicted reality testing is a live issue.

Fearing any or all of these three kinds of empathetic interaction, the analysand will mount a sustained assault on any empathizing or even the prospect of it. The analyst will be worked on to become as moralistic, impatience, fragmented, fatigued, secretive, bored, discouraged, hostile, or sexually aroused as the analysands are or fear they might become. And owing to the analysands’ having remained unconsciously desperate throughout their lives, and owing to the cunning strategies that, unconsciously, have been born of this continuing dread—strategies whose cunning it is impossible to overestimate—they skillfully sabotage the analyst’s empathizing. Indeed, it is essential that the analyst empathize with the desperation implied by these very assaults. Otherwise, the most dreadful kinds of negative countertransference may ensue. Against these assaults, along with the other attributes of his or her empathic second self, the analyst requires stamina, staying power.

So far we have considered the following factors: maintaining a sense of self-cohesiveness, anticipating events with the help of an integrated frame of reference, learning while doing, and being alert to attacks on empathizing and being empathized with. There is one more important factor to consider, and that is the analyst’s ability to maintain a long-range view of the analysis as a whole. At every stage of the analysis, the analyst must be ready to look ahead, from the beginning of the analysis to the present moment and beyond it, in order to locate the analysand in a context of dangerous change. Knowing the starting point and the route thus far helps maintain perspective on present and anticipated difficulty. This long-range aspect of empathizing, which makes analytic restraint more useful and less wearing than it would be otherwise, has been generally overlooked; in the main, analysts have focused on empathy of the moment, perhaps because of their conception of empathic response as imitative. I shall return to the question of imitation later in this chapter.

By emphasizing stamina as a feature of the analyst’s second self that safeguards empathizing, I may seem to have shifted from the mediation of empathizing to its facilitation. But I would argue that the shift is more apparent than real in that, often, it is sustained empathizing in extended contexts that is in question, and sustaining an empathic orientation is a manifestation of stamina. Pressured, hasty, fragmentary attempts at empathizing frighten and wound analysands, as they do children, and they lead to renewed attacks on empathizing itself. Seen in this light, stamina and its constituents are essential features of the analyst’s empathic second self.
If, as I have proposed, the analytic relationship amounts to a meeting and a development of two second selves, defined to a large extent by the nature of the analytic project, then it follows that this relationship may be called fictive. Fictive, not in the sense of artificial, inauthentic, or illusory, but in the sense of a relationship constructed by two people under highly specialized dialogic circumstances. It is not, however, its approximation to uniqueness that makes it fictive. All relationships have a fictive aspect in that they are constructed by both parties involved; they are constructed out of what is conventionally realistic and expectable and what is fantasized unconsciously. Among other things, the word fictive means fashioned or invented by imagination, and within the psychoanalytic perspective, all relationships are necessarily approached as fictive.

I centered first on the analysand's second self and then on the analyst's. By calling them "second," I have not intended to distinguish them from some kind of real, uninvented, or unfashioned self. I have intended only to indicate their specialized nature. Nor did I mean by "second" that there is a single "first" self, monolithic and constant in all other relationships. It is just that the analytic second self is not identical with those constructed or narrated in nonanalytic relationships.

In order to clarify my point about the fictive analytic selves-in-relation I shall next discuss the second self in relation to action language and also in relation to values.

How does the second self stand in relation to action language? Let me remind you that, to begin with, I spoke of organizing and presenting a second self; also, that I emphasized that it is the analyst's performance rather than his or her consciously given testimony which counts in this regard. I made these points in order to indicate how the entire matter might be couched in the terms of action. In keeping with my recent theoretical work on the reconceptualization of psychoanalysis, I do believe that the second self—and the first self too, for that matter—are for systematic purposes better conceptualized as actions and modes of action. The analytic second self is a way of conducting an analysis. It does not refer to an essence that lies behind the actions and expresses itself through them. And it does not refer exclusively or without amendment to the analyst's self-descriptions. Indeed, the designa-

In the second self is best thought of as a narrative device, a form of description or interpretation of the analyst insofar as he or she is working effectively as an analyst, that is, in the fictive mode of working analytically. One could therefore dispense with the concept of self and speak only of the analyst who empathizes sensitively and in a sustained, informed, and coherent manner and who often performs better in the work context than in his or her purely personal situations.

Why, then, have I stayed with the idea of the second self? There are two reasons, the first being that from the standpoint of action language, the second self is preferable to the "work ego." It is preferable in that "work ego" stems from the mechanistic and anthropomorphic mode of conceptualization that characterizes traditional metapsychological language and which action language is intended to replace. The second reason is that, for the time being, I find much inspiration in the concept as it has been used in literary discussion of the second or implied selves of authors and readers (see especially Booth, 1961). There is much to be gained by establishing bridges between the two interpretive disciplines of psychoanalysis and literary studies. In many respects, literary critics are far ahead of psychoanalysts in their examination of the principles and problems of analyzing discourse and dialogue in terms of their transformational aspects. As a rule, psychoanalysts have been more concerned with the content of psychoanalytic dialogue and the long-range personal changes effected by this dialogue than they have been with the personal changes that mediate or enable effective discourse and dialogue of one kind or another.

With regard to values: I have been emphasizing that the empathizing analyst often performs better in work than in nonanalytic personal relationships. It does not follow from this proposition that the analytic second self is in some absolute sense a better self. It is better for analytic purposes. To claim for it any more than this would be to impose on the analyst a set of values or an ideology that favors something like saintliness or being a savior as a way of life. It would be to disregard the fact that it is precisely because the analyst is conducting an analysis that he or she must put in parentheses many aspects of the first self, that is, the self of his or her nonanalytic relationships. If they are not put in parentheses, then they must be consistently noted and reflected upon, often arduously, in order to sort out countertransference from appropriate analytic activity.

Idealizing the analyst's second self as a proper model for all human interaction can only have unfortunate consequences. Instead of all re-
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Relationships becoming that much more exaltedly human, they become pseudo-clinical or pseudo-analytic relationships, and as such they are disruptive and often destructive. Family relationships, work relationships, the routine business relationships of everyday life, each calls for a type of dialogue in which the development and interpretation of unconscious resisting and transference are beside the point and most likely will be disturbing. The fictive elements and the aims of these relationships are not the same as those of the analytic relationship. On the other hand, I do not imply that the analyst ought never use his or her analytic understanding in everyday life. That restrictive policy would be self-crippling as well as inauthentic, and, in any event, impossible. In this respect, questions of balance and flexibility will always have to be dealt with, and they are not easy to answer.

Empathizing and Imitating

The best empathizing is not that which is undertaken in a deliberate way. In this respect, one may liken empathizing to flashes of wit. As Freud (1905b) pointed out and Kris (1952) elaborated, the work of wit is best performed preconsciously and unconsciously. We know empathic response not so much by the analyst’s intent, or by its outward form, as by the developments to which it gives rise. As I mentioned, explicit and insistent empathizing might, among other things, mortify the analysand, in which case the model of the analysand at that moment may be considered flawed and the analyst’s conduct not truly empathic. Often, in the course of analytic sessions, there is not even enough time for the analyst to cogitate briefly before responding, or not responding, to the analysand’s self-presentations. Analysts feel their way, and often they learn after the fact, if they learn at all, when and how they have acted empathically. Sometimes analysands tell them only long after the event how important a response, a significant silence, or the maintenance of respectful distance was to their sense of being understood, appreciated, empathized with. It is easier to identify what is emotionally out of tune than what is exquisitely in tune. Consequently, there is a major retrospective aspect to the identification of empathizing.

Upon reflection, one may define here a major ambiguity of analytic work. The ambiguity attaches to the place of imitation in empathizing.

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This ambiguity arises because the empathic value of an intervention or nonintervention may be appreciated only after the analysand has changed in some significant way. Having changed, the analysand will be using a new perspective on the history of the analytic relationship to date, and the original empathizing may have helped make that change of perspective possible, though it cannot be regarded as having been effective apart from the interpretation with which it was correlated.

Again, we may draw an analogy to art, more specifically to aesthetics. The analogy involves the much debated question of imitation. Does art imitate life, or is it the case, as Oscar Wilde (1889) suggested in earnest, that to a great extent life imitates art? In the latter case, art is viewed as the creation of new ways of constructing experience and thus as the maker of new modes of living generally and new retrospective considerations specifically. It should not be necessary to make the case for the proposition that we live in ways that to a noteworthy extent have been shaped, directly and indirectly, by the constructions of artists and other creative people. In this connection we must acknowledge the shaping and reshaping of our ideas of what love is or Nature, a self, a noble person, a beautiful woman, or a Jewish identity in America.

Returning now to the ambiguity I mentioned, one must ask to what extent empathizing is imitative and to what extent it is constitutive of new experience. To what extent does the fictive meeting of the two second selves in the analytic situation give rise to empathizing of a very special sort? This is empathizing that creates in the person of the analysand someone who has never quite existed before for anyone in that articulated form or with that intensity. To what extent does this encounter give rise to new modes of conceiving of self and others and thereby to a new possibility on the analysand’s part of recognizing, appreciating, and performing specific acts of empathizing?

I think that the most conservative yet still adequate answer to these questions is that analytic empathizing cannot be, as Freud (1921) and Fenichel (1945) seemed to think, largely imitative. Among its other features, the imitative conception is restricted to only a few elements of what earlier I called empathy of the moment as against empathizing in extended contexts. Less conservatively, I would join with Oscar Wilde to the extent of emphasizing the creative cognitive aspects over the imitative while still acknowledging that, often, the imitative aspects remain important constituents of complex empathic actions. I would add to this that, whatever we do regard as new in the empathic
construction, we should not view it as discontinuous with all that has come before it, that is to say, as understandable without reference to the past.

Presumably, the imitative aspects take in one person's immediate response, through an act of identification, to another person's emotionally expressive physical changes, such as smiles, tears, tone of voice, and clenched fists, when these are part of the scene. Yet even here one does not respond altogether innocently. Each of us establishes and employs models not only of the particular expressive person and context but of expressiveness itself. We rely on these models to help us sort out the essential from the inessential, the intense from the mild, the straightforward from the ironic, and the authentic from the inauthentic. Some tears are crocodile tears, some laughter is derisive, some scoldings are affectionate, some affection is ingratitude. We have to be able to tell the difference.

In a transference-countertransference impasse, the analyst fails to see the difference. What is involved here is a faulty model constructed by the analyst. It may be a model that is out-of-date, that is, one that disregards important changes in the analysand, or it may be a model distorted by any number of other factors. It may take a crisis in the analytic relationship to make this discrepancy or lag clear and to open up the model for revision or correction (Schafer, 1959).

In any case, the purely imitative-identificatory view depends too much on the split between subject and object. The transformational view I am advocating emphasizes how, in empathizing, we reflect or imitate something we have already shaped, and in so doing shape it further.

I want now to relate a very short story told about Picasso. The story makes my point about the transformational and fictive aspects of empathizing far more succinctly than I have. When told at first that his now celebrated portrait of Gertrude Stein did not resemble her at all, Picasso replied simply and with enviable confidence, “It will.”

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transference phenomena; and he held to this view even though he recognized that the difference between “real” love and transference love is not nearly so great as it might appear. My amendment is this; a significant part of what analysands are responding to is the presentation of the analytic second self, through which analysts can sometime empathize in such extraordinary and intense a fashion. Loewald’s (1960) concept of the analyst as a new object, and my proposal (in chapter 8) that transference within psychoanalysis is a new form of experience for the analysand, however much it is unconsciously repetitive—these and other such ideas form the background of what I am saying now about empathizing through an analytic second self. In my view, m; amendment enriches rather than diminishes our understanding of only what goes into analytic collaboration or “alliance” but of the concept of transference itself. It is enriching in that it articulates the idea of the object of transference and thereby facilitates the essential analysis of transference’s unconsciously repetitive aspects.

Looking at it from this point of view, one may say that there are three mistakes that we analysts are liable to make. The first is when we think we are necessarily as finely tuned empathically in our ordinary lives as we can be in our work; the second mistake, emphasized by Freud, is when we think that we are as special, even in our analysis of ourselves, as our analysands sometimes say we are; the third is when we think that the analysand’s love, respect, and gratitude are simply an only blind repetitions and therefore entirely unearned.

The Analysand’s Response to the Analyst’s Second Self

In conclusion, I want to amend Freud’s proposition that analysts should not be misled by their analysands’ enthusiasm and desire for them. He argued that this love and this idealization are essentially